Competition Policy in Public Choice Perspective
Document Type
Contribution to Book
Journal/Book Title/Conference
The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics
Volume
1
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Publication Date
4-7-2015
First Page
147
Last Page
171
Abstract
Antitrust (competition) policy in the United States and Europe commonly is seen as well intentioned in the abstract, but flawed in practice. This chapter applies public choice reasoning to explain why laws ostensibly designed to protect consumers against the abuses of unfettered market power often fail to achieve that objective. Recognizing that the antitrust law enforcement agencies and the courts are peopled by rational, self-interested actors, the chapter summarizes the theory and abundant evidence suggesting that antitrust is no different than other forms of economic regulation and, thus, is influenced by special interest groups, which exert pressure through the legislative committees that oversee the law-enforcement bureaus. Exploring how the competition policy process actually operates undermines the untenable assumption that antitrust is designed to protect the public’s interest.
Recommended Citation
McChesney, Fred; Shughart, William F. II; and Reksulak, Michael, "Competition Policy in Public Choice Perspective" (2015). Economics and Finance Faculty Publications. Paper 986.
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/econ_facpubs/986
