Session
Session 5: Ground
Abstract
As the complexity of embedded computing platforms continues to grow, small satellites are increasingly deployed with operating systems having known cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Using common exploit techniques, potential intruders may compromise the capabilities and the integrity of the space mission. Moreover, the prominent use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products in small satellites also increases the probability of attack via widely known vulnerabilities associated with commercially manufactured parts. System developers frequently assume that software and hardware components communicate through specified interfaces and primary data paths, but these assumptions cannot be fully guaranteed. By architecting secure space vehicle and ground control systems with functionally correct software components, mission critical vulnerabilities may be reduced.
Presentation
High-Assurance Cyber Space Systems for Small Satellite Mission Integrity
As the complexity of embedded computing platforms continues to grow, small satellites are increasingly deployed with operating systems having known cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Using common exploit techniques, potential intruders may compromise the capabilities and the integrity of the space mission. Moreover, the prominent use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products in small satellites also increases the probability of attack via widely known vulnerabilities associated with commercially manufactured parts. System developers frequently assume that software and hardware components communicate through specified interfaces and primary data paths, but these assumptions cannot be fully guaranteed. By architecting secure space vehicle and ground control systems with functionally correct software components, mission critical vulnerabilities may be reduced.
